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Raw Deal: Trade Implications of the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration's Pending Review of
Unpasteurized Cheeses
Martha Ingram*
INTRODUCTION
Cheese lovers and food snobs the world over vow that the
taste of pasteurized process cheeses simply cannot compare to
that of cheeses made from raw (unpasteurized) milk.' In such
European countries as France and Italy, fine cheeses are prized
to such a great extent that the highest honor a cheese-maker
can attain is creating a cheese so unique that it is given a desig-
nation of origin 2 - an honor only given to cheeses containing the
* J.D. candidate, 2004, University of Minnesota Law School. Special thanks to
my husband, Richard Ingram, for the steadfast encouragement and enthusiastic
cheese-tasting research assistance.
1. Marlene Cimons, Cheese Lovers Poke Holes in Possible Rules on Aged Prod-
ucts, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at A5; see, e.g., Richard Tarlov, Cheese in the Raw:
The Naked Truth, available at http://www.projecttruffle.com/truffledcontent
/cheeseintheraw.cfm (last visited Jan. 17, 2003). For an entertaining description of a
cheese tasting experiment involving pasteurized and raw-milk versions of the same
cheese, see Burkhard Bilger, Raw Faith: The Nun and the Cheese Underground,
NEW YORKER, Aug. 19 & 26, 2002, at 153-54.
McCalman reached over and cut wedges from two Reblochon-style cheeses,
one of pasteurized milk, the other of raw. We had done a few of these com-
parisons already, with the pasteurized invariably tasting milder, gummier,
and less complex. But this time the difference was more elemental. The
pasteurized version wasn't bad, with its musty orange rind and rich ivory
pate. But the raw-milk Reblochon seemed to bypass the taste buds and tap
directly into the brain, its sweet, nutty, earthy notes rising and expanding
from register to register, echoing in the upper palate as though in a sound
chamber. I thought of something one of the founders of the Cheese of
Choice Coalition had said when I asked her what difference raw milk could
possibly make: 'One is a cheese; the other is an aria by Maria Callas.'
Id.
2. "The AOC [appellation d'origine controlee - French acronym translated into
English as 'designation of origin'] system restricts the right to produce select wines
and cheeses to a designated geographic region associated with those foods .... re-
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highly individual flavors imparted by raw milk from a specific
region.' In the United States, despite regulations dating back to
1949 that prohibit the sale of any raw milk cheese not aged for
sixty days, cheese aficionados have been able to find plenty of
imported aged raw-milk cheese, along with an impressive and
growing number of domestic aged raw-milk cheeses.4 It has
even been relatively easy - though not legal - to obtain im-
ported raw-milk cheeses aged for less than sixty days.5 How-
ever, a pending review by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) of regulations concerning the manufacture and sale of
raw-milk cheese could radically alter the cheese landscape in
the United States. If the FDA concludes that raw-milk cheeses
are unsafe at any age, their manufacture, import, and sale will
likely be banned in the United States.
While government regulators and large-scale cheese manu-
facturers in the United States would welcome this outcome, it
has prompted dismay in other quarters, namely U.S.-based ar-
tisanal cheese-makers, cheese importers, and lovers of fine
quiring them to be processed in the same region where the raw agricultural com-
modities - grapes or milk - are produced." Jim Chen, A Sober Look at Appellations
of Origin: How the United States Will Crash France's Wine and Cheese Party, 5
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 29, 29 (1996). For discussions of cases concerning the im-
portance of maintaining designations of origin within the European Union, see J.
Mosca, The Battle Between the Cheeses Signifies the Ongoing Struggle to Protect Des-
ignations of Origin Within the European Community and in the United States in
Consorzio per la Tutela del Formaggio Gorgonzola v. Kaserei Champignon Hofmeis-
ter Gmbh & Co., 8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 559 (2000); Origin Marking - Opinion of
Advocate General Lgger in Case C-66/00 Criminal Proceedings against Dante Bigi,
EU FOOD L. NEWS, Oct. 9, 2001, available at http://www.foodlaw.rdg.ac.uk/news/eu-
01158.htm.
3. European Community law defines the AOC as "the name of a region, a spe-
cific place.., used to describe an agricultural product or a foodstuff... originating
in that region ... and the quality or characteristics of which are essentially or exclu-
sively due to a particular geographical environment with its inherent natural and
human factors." Council Regulation 2081192, art. 2.2(a), 1992 O.J. (L 208) 2.
4. Bilger, supra note 1, at 150 ("Cheesemakers... are creating their own ru-
ral tradition... and rivaling Europeans for the first time.").
5. See id. at 153 ("Online, Fromages.com will send raw-milk cheeses from
France to anyone with a credit card.").
6. "These endangered hard cheeses aren't some obscure varieties that appear
only on the menus of tony bistros. Among the hundreds of cheeses that would be af-
fected by a ban are... distinguished old cheeses traditionally made using raw milk,
cheeses like Roquefort, Pecorino-Romano, Parmigiano-Reggiano, Swiss Gruyere and
Emmentaler. And, oh yes, that old standby, cheddar." Mark Bushnell, The Cheese
Has an Ally: UVM Researcher Fights Possible Ban on Unpasteurized Cheese by FDA,
RUTLAND HERALD, Feb. 23, 2002, available at http://rutlandherald.nybor.com
/Archive/Articles/42913 (last visited Mar. 9, 2003).
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cheese, along with European cheese producers and exporters.7
European concerns show that the possible FDA ban raises sev-
eral issues relating to international trade. These include de-
termining how individual countries should determine proper
food safety guidelines for import or export; how existing World
Trade Organization (WTO) regulations should be interpreted by
its member countries; and, the circumstances under which indi-
vidual countries should be able to impose their own food safety
requirements on imported products, even if these requirements
exceed those established by the international authority. Specifi-
cally, it is likely that the WTO will have to confront the issue of
whether a ban of raw-milk cheese imports by the United States,
based on an FDA-mandated pasteurization requirement, would
impose impermissible trade restrictions on European Union
(EU) countries that do not require pasteurization of the milk
used to manufacture cheeses.
Part I of this Note summarizes the history of cheese regula-
tion in the United States and places it in the context of the de-
velopment of global guidelines for safe cheese manufacture.
Part I also addresses how proper safety guidelines for cheese are
determined in different countries and how the WTO attempts to
deal with different guidelines through its Agreement on the Ap-
plication of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agree-
ment).8 Next, Part II argues that the differing scientific prem-
ises used by the United States and the EU to determine the
safety of raw-milk cheeses will inevitably cause a conflict that
the WTO will have to resolve through application of the SPS
Agreement. Part II also demonstrates that both legal and policy
arguments support the EU's likely position against a ban on
raw-milk cheese, despite arguments in support of such a ban.
Finally, the Conclusion recommends that the FDA leave its cur-
rent regulations in place and refrain from promulgating a
stricter regulatory scheme.
7. See id. (quoting a Vermont cheese-maker as saying, "We are dependent on
making and marketing a special product .... If that operation is regulated out of
existence, then so is our business.").
8. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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I. THE HISTORY OF CHEESE REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. THE HISTORY OF U.S. CHEESE REGULATION
Until the 1940s, the United States maintained no require-
ment that cheeses be made from pasteurized milk.9 Like
Europe, the United States relied primarily on small, artisanal
manufacturers, with their long tradition of creating safe cheeses
from raw milk."° War-driven industrialization changed this state
of affairs." Along with mass production of cheese during World
War II came greater concerns for safety and standardization of
quality. 12 As the U.S. farming industry became more industrial-
ized and more dairy products began moving in interstate com-
merce and overseas trade, the U.S. government stepped in to
regulate them, instituting a pasteurization 3 requirement for
cheese manufacture. 4 Today, the Code of Federal Regulations
9. The possibility of mandatory pasteurization was first mentioned in the
Federal Register in 1947 in its Notice of Hearing "for the purpose of receiving evi-
dence upon the basis of which regulations may be promulgated amending the defini-
tions and standards of identity for.., cheese." Standards of Identity for Cheeses,
Processed Cheeses, Cheese Foods, Cheese Spreads, and Related Foods, 12 Fed. Reg.
1192, 1192 (Feb. 21, 1947) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 19) [hereinafter Standards
of Identity for Cheeses].
10. See Corby Kummer, Craftsman Cheese, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1, 2000,
at 109.
11. Id. at 110. Kummer notes that a pasteurization requirement was added
out of concern that untrained large-scale cheese manufacturers would endanger pub-
lic health through unsafe manufacturing processes, not out of any sudden concern
for the safety of raw milk as an ingredient in cheeses. Id. The number of qualified
cheese-makers in the United States dropped precipitously during World War II, and
at the same time the demand for cheese grew, resulting in mass-produced cheeses
manufactured by cheese-makers ignorant of the safety mechanisms built into tradi-
tional cheese manufacturing. Id.
12. Id.
13. "Milk shall be deemed to have been pasteurized if it has been held at a time
and temperature of not less than 1430 for a period of not less than thirty minutes."
See Standards of Identity for Cheeses, supra note 9, at 1192.
14. In its findings, the FDA first discussed the potential danger posed by un-
pasteurized milk in cheese production:
Milk obtained from infected animals may and often does contain microor-
ganisms capable of causing disease in humans. At present it is practically
impossible to insure the use in cheese making of milk free from such micro-
organisms. Milk may also become contaminated with pathogenic microor-
ganisms from persons handling it. Pasteurization of the milk destroys such
microorganisms... Sufficiently high temperatures to destroy pathogenic
microorganisms are not reached in cheese manufacturing, and any present
in the milk are usually carried over into the cheese. Such cheese may
[Vol. 12:2
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provides that all products for human consumption in the U.S.
containing milk or milk products must be pasteurized. 15 Never-
theless, cheeses made with raw milk are subject to an exception,
as long as they meet a sixty-day aging requirement.
16
Six years ago, however, a small study in South Dakota 7
concluded that E. coli bacteria could survive the sixty-day aging
period required for all cheeses made from unpasteurized milk.
18
Although the South Dakota researchers recognized that "the low
number of outbreaks seem to indicate that pathogens in cheese
are not a major problem," they concluded that current require-
ments for the ripening of cheddar cheese do not adequately pro-
transmit infections to customers... No outbreak has been reported from
cheese held sixty days or more.
Cheeses, Processed Cheeses, Cheese Foods, Cheese Spreads, and Related Foods;
Definitions and Standards of Identity, 14 Fed. Reg. 1960, 1961 (Apr. 22, 1949) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 19) [hereinafter Definitions].
15. Mandatory Pasteurization for All Milk and Milk Products in Final Package
Form Intended for Direct Human Consumption, 21 C.F.R. § 1240.61 (2002) (stating
that all milk and milk products for human consumption, with the exception of
cheeses undergoing alternative treatments, must be pasteurized).
16. See, e.g., FDA, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Requirements for Spe-
cific Standardized Cheese and Related Products, 21 C.F.R. §§ 133.150, 133.182,
133.187 (2002) (setting forth sixty-day aging requirement for different types of raw
milk cheese). In its findings of fact, the FDA noted that "[v]iable pathogenic micro-
organisms in cheese.., tend to die when the cheese is held for some time at tem-
peratures above thirty-five degrees Fahrenheit .... If cheese made from unpasteur-
ized milk is held for sixty days after its manufacture at temperatures of thirty-five
degrees Fahrenheit or above, it is reasonable to expect that the cheese will be safe
for human consumption." See Definitions, 14 Fed. Reg. 1960, 1961. Aging is be-
lieved to kill pathogens due to several interacting factors. During aging, the cheese's
acidity increases and its water content decreases, creating a hostile environment for
pathogens; the sixty-day threshold has generally been considered to be the minimum
amount of time necessary for this to occur. Bushnell, supra note 6.
Also, cheese-makers add salt to the curd to further hinder bacterial growth.
Bilger, supra note 1, at 153. The aging requirement has already resulted in the ban
of all raw-milk cheeses under sixty days old. Id. Though prized in Europe, these
cheeses cannot legally be sold in the United States. Id. This has not prevented a
healthy black market in such cheeses from springing up, to which the FDA has
turned a blind eye. "This spring, at Murray's Cheese shop, in Greenwich Village, a
raw-milk Camenbert was perched on a mound of its pasteurized cousins, with a
small sign stuck into it: 'Get this before the F.D.A. does.'" Id.
17. Christine J. Reitsma & David R. Henning, Escherichia coli 0157:H7 in Ex-
perimental Cheddar Cheese, 59 J. FOOD PROT. 460 (1995). In this study, the re-
searchers tested cheddar cheese made with pasteurized milk in brine containing ar-
tificially low salt levels by inoculating it with E.coli bacteria. Id.
18. For information about Escherichia coli 0157:H7, see U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN./CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, BAD BUG BOOK:
FOODBORNE PATHOGENIC MICROORGANISMS AND NATURAL TOXINS HANDBOOK,
available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-mow/chapl5.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
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tect consumers. 9 The FDA took note of the South Dakota
study,2' and immediately initiated its own study2 to verify these
results.22 The FDA study was to be part of a review of the exist-
ing regulations concerning the manufacture of raw-milk cheese
2 1
and was included in the FDA's lists of priority research projects
for 2000-200 1.24 Third-party reviews of the South Dakota and
FDA studies, however, found the research methods used were
scientifically questionable 2' and argued that "pasteurized
cheeses, in fact, might be more dangerous than unpasteurized
ones.., since raw-milk cheeses have natural flora that can out-
compete pathogens."2 As a result of these negative reviews, the
FDA review lost its priority status in 2002.27 While the results
of the FDA study were due to be published by the end of Sep-
tember 2002,2s they have yet to be released as of the date of this
Note.
19. Reitsma & Henning, supra note 17, at 12.
20. Judith Weinraub, Endangered Species?: Why the Cheeses You Enjoy Today
Could Be Gone Tomorrow, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2000, at F1 (discussing the fact that
the FDA also took note of European studies showing that salmonella and listeria
could survive this limit).
21. F.D.A., THREE YEAR RESEARCH PLAN: PROJECT No. 13: SURVIVAL OF FOOD
PATHOGENS DURING THE 60-DAY AGING PERIOD OF HARD CHEESES MADE FROM
UNPASTEURIZED MILK, available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/3fs3rel3.html (last
visited Jan. 17, 2003).
22. The study was conducted under controlled conditions by injecting samples
of cheddar cheese with several thousand times more E. coli than would normally en-
ter the product during the manufacturing process. See id.
23. Id.
24. Bushnell, supra note 6.
25. See, e.g., C.W. Donnelly, Factors Associated with Hygienic Control and
Quality of Cheeses Prepared from Raw Milk: A Review, 369 BULL. OF THE INT'L
DAIRY FED'N 16, 16-17 (2001). Donnelly, a professor of food microbiology at the Uni-
versity of Vermont and an expert on foodborne pathogens, has criticized the South
Dakota study and the FDA follow-up study because of their artificial study condi-
tions. Id. She considers the flawed research methods to be fatal to the studies'
stated goals and notes that raw-milk cheeses "have enjoyed a remarkable safety re-
cord." Id.; see also Bilger, supra note 1, at 156.
26. Bushnell, supra note 6 (quoting food-safety researcher Donnelly: "If you did
a survey of hard cheeses in the U.S., you might find a higher incidence of listeria in
pasteurized cheeses.").
27. Id.
28. Id. If these results show that pathogens can survive the sixty-day limit still
allowed under current regulations, the FDA review is likely to resume its priority
status. The 1949 findings recorded in the Federal Register make it clear that the
sixty-day aging period for cheeses made with raw milk was intended to carve out an
exception to a general ban on raw-milk cheeses, since it was thought that pathogens
could not survive this period. If it were proven that pathogens could survive beyond
sixty days, the basis for this narrow exception would fail. The logical outcome would
be a general ban on the manufacture or importation of cheeses using raw milk.
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B. THE HISTORY OF CHEESE REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
At the beginning of the twentieth century, regulations for
cheese manufacture in Europe were analogous to those in the
United States - which is to say, nonexistent.2 9 The post-war re-
action of the Europeans to increased foreign trade and large-
scale production of cheeses differed from that of the United
States, however. Rather than requiring pasteurization of the
raw milk used to create cheese, European governments gener-
ally have taken a less technologically invasive approach; in-
stead, they have increased inspection of manufacturing facilities
and regulation of the manufacturing methods used.3"
With the establishment of the European Community (now
the EU), member countries, whose standards and methods of
raw-milk regulation varied considerably from country to coun-
try, 1 entered into an ongoing debate on the appropriate regula-
tory measures to adopt for the manufacture of raw-milk prod-
ucts throughout the EC. 2 This debate resulted in EC Directives
29. Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the
United States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525, 532
(1998) (discussing the general European attitude that traditional production of
cheese is safe, since it has been produced over centuries without regulation and with
few public health consequences).
30. For a discussion of the cultural attitudes shaping the different regulations
set in place by the European Union and the United States and the ramifications of
these cultural positions on international trade of food products, see id. Echols points
out that "European citizens have tended to favor traditional foods and minimal proc-
essing, while being skeptical of new technologies .... In contrast, the Americans
have been more willing to accept new technologies, an attitude that supports ....
changing technology but is skeptical of some traditional production processes." Id.
at 526. In other words, the United States assumes that ingredients subjected to
processing with new technologies will lead to safe cheese, while Europeans assume
that a highly-regulated manufacturing process will achieve the same result. Id.
31. In general, the southern European nations, including Spain, France, and
Italy, favored less stringent regulatory controls on cheese-makers, while the north-
ern European countries, in particular Germany and the Scandinavian countries, fa-
vored strict regulation or even an outright ban of raw-milk cheese. See VERMONT
CHEESE COUNCIL, RAW MILK CHEESE STUDY, available at http://www.vtcheese.com
/vtcheese/rawmilk-files/rawmilk2.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
32. Id. This schism among the EU nations has resulted in continued contro-
versy and even lawsuits. "Raw milk is ... banned in Denmark, where there is a
court case pending. This is based on the contention that raw milk is not illegal un-
der EU law and so cannot be banned by individual governments." Judy Ridgway, In
Defence of Raw Milk; Getting More Difficult to Make Derivatives for General Con-
sumption, DAIRY INDUSTRIES INT'L, Dec. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 19704671; see
also E. Koohan Paik, Homogenized Planet: Standards in the Cheese Industry,
WORLD WATCH, Mar./Apr. 2001, at 20. Paik described the current atmosphere as
follows:
2003]
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setting forth rules for the production, sale, and trade of raw-
milk cheese among EC member countries.33 This laid the
groundwork for member states to construct their own laws and
regulations within an overarching EC framework.34 Each mem-
ber country agreed to base its own regulation system on the con-
cept of self-controls. This concept is founded on the principles of
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points).35 Thus,
EU member nations created a collective agreement and method-
ology for ensuring food safety, basing their regulations on the
idea that each country assess and manage risk. This theory
has proven compatible with the philosophy of the Codex Alimen-
tarius Committee on Food Hygiene (Codex), which oversees the
SPS Agreement promulgated by the WTO .
It quickly became evident that pasteurization at the policymaking level in
Europe had taken the tired, nationalistic form of a North-versus-South is-
sue. Rather than recognize how standardization would rob the continent of
the opportunity to celebrate regional differences, governments had turned
on each other and formed two stubborn camps. England, Germany, and
Denmark were viewing raw milk as a threat to sanitation, while Spain,
France, and Greece saw pasteurization as a violation of heritage .... As
long as the Codex Alimentarius, the World Trade Organization's de facto
regulatory commission, is charged with imposing a single standard, North
and South will remain stalemated.
Id. at 27.
33. Council Directive 92/46/EEC, arts. 3-33, 1992 O.J. (L 268) 1 (laying down
the health rules for the production and placing on the market of raw milk, heat-
treated milk and milk-based products); Council Directive 93/43/EEC, art. 5, 1993
O.J. (L 175) 1 (addressing the hygiene of foodstuffs).
34. See Council Directive 92/46/EEC, supra note 33.
35. For a description of the HACCP methodology, see Michael R. Taylor, Pre-
paring America's Food Safety System for the Twenty-First Century - Who is Respon-
sible for What When it Comes to Meeting the Food Safety Challenges of the Con-
sumer-Driven Global Economy?, 52 FOOD DRUG L.J. 13 (1997). HACCP involves
seven principles: (1) analyzing potential hazards; (2) identifying critical control
points at which the potential hazard can be controlled or eliminated; (3) establishing
preventive measures with critical limits for each control point; (4) establishing pro-
cedures to monitor the critical control points; (5) establishing corrective actions to be
taken when monitoring shows that a critical limit has not been met; (6) establishing
procedures to verify that the system is working properly; and (7) establishing effec-
tive recordkeeping to document the HACCP system. Id. at 20. Each of these princi-
ples must be backed by sound scientific knowledge (e.g., published microbiological
studies on time and temperature factors for controlling foodborne pathogens). See
FDA BACKGROUNDER, HACCP: A STATE-OF-THE-ART APPROACH TO FOOD SAFETY, at
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-Ird/bghaccp.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003).
36. VERMONT CHEESE COUNCIL, supra note 31.
37. The Codex Alimentarius Commission was created in 1963 by the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO). CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, FAO/WHO Food Standards: Codex Alimen-
tarius: Welcome, at http://www.codexalimentarius.net (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
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C. GATT, THE WTO, AND THE SPS AGREEMENT
After World War II, around the same time that the FDA be-
gan requiring the pasteurization of cheese, several western
European countries and the United States created an interna-
tional trade agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). 3' The purpose of GATT was to encourage inter-
national trade by lowering international tariffs 39  As part of
GATT, the signatory countries attempted to create an enforcing
organization called the International Trade Organization," but
this attempt was thwarted by the refusal of the United States to
ratify that portion of the agreement.41 Despite the lack of an of-
ficial body to settle trade disputes, the early GATT process,
which allowed member countries to negotiate lower tariffs be-
tween nations as the need arose, worked well for over two dec-
ades.42
During the 1970s and 1980s, however, special interests in-
creasingly strained the good-will negotiation and enforcement
Its task was to develop food standards and guidelines, along with codes of practice
under the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program. Id. The main purposes of the
Codex program are "protecting health of the consumers and ensuring fair trade
practices in the food trade, and promoting coordination of all food standards work
undertaken by international governmental and non-governmental organizations."
Id. Thus, the Codex, like the EU, encourages individual countries to establish their
own food standards, as long as they meet the minimal requirements established by
the Codex. The Codex guidelines for cheese state that pasteurization is permitted,
but not required. CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, Codex General Standard for Cheese, A-6-
1978, Rev. 1-1999, at 4 (amended 2001), available at http://www.codexalimentarius
.net (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
38. Daniel R. Murray, Comment, Foie Gras?: Making Economic Sense of the
1999 U.S. Tariffs on Gourmet European Goods, 5 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 243, 245
(1999) (citing Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 2-3 (1999)). For an
overview of GATT, see the WTO website, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
gatt-e/gatt-e.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) [hereinafter GATT Overview].
39. See GATT Overview, supra note 38. For an interesting alternative eco-
nomic theory of the purpose of GATT, see Claire Moore Dickerson, GATT 1994:
Fool's Goal?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 259, 260 (1996). Dickerson argues that the
theme of GATT is the perceived self-interest of each member nation, while its pur-
pose is imposition of "the discipline not to abuse short-term opportunities at the ex-
pense of long-term benefits." Id. Thus, even if one country produces a good better
than any other country, far-sighted self-restraint in allowing a second country to
produce the good because that is what it does best leads to greater global prosperity.
Id. This, in turn, leads to greater long-term prosperity for the first country, though
it sacrifices a short-term advantage. Id. at 261.
40. Murray, supra note 38, at 245.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 246. This was largely due to the fact that the members at that time
were primarily western European, like-minded countries with similar interests. Id.
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system that initially made GATT successful.4 '3 This increasing
tension eventually led to a call for a rule-based enforcement and
dispute resolution system.4 Finally, when the GATT members
met in Uruguay in 1994, they hammered out provisions for the
formation of an international trade authority, the WTO . This
organization had a number of important objectives, such as pro-
viding timely and enforceable rulings on international trade
disputes; providing a forum for trade negotiations; and, estab-
lishing minimum guidelines for the safety of products moving in
global trade."
During the Uruguay round of discussions in 1994, WTO
member countries drafted the SPS Agreement, an agreement on
health and safety measures for agricultural and food products.47
The SPS Agreement addresses the need for international stan-
dards in food safety.45 The main thrust of the SPS Agreement is
that free trade should be encouraged among all nations, despite
differences in technological advancement, with the understand-
ing that developed countries should not be prevented from im-
posing their own stricter regulations to protect the health of
their citizens. 49 Therefore, a single set of food safety regulations
for all member nations is considered inadvisable. 0
Much as the EU did with its Directives of 1993 and 1994,51
WTO member countries strove to fashion the SPS Agreement
into a collective agreement containing enough flexibility that
individual WTO member countries could produce goods for for-
eign trade without radically changing regulations already in
place, as long as the products conformed to "international stan-
dards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist."
52
Thus, the SPS Agreement uses a framework of minimum guide-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 246.
45. WTO, WHAT IS THE WTO?, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e
/whatise/whatise.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
46. Id.
47. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/sps-e/spsagr-e.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2003)
[hereinafter SPS Agreement].
48. The preamble to the SPS Agreement asserts that "no Member should be
prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health. . ." Id. at pmbl.
49. Id. at arts. 9, 11-14.
50. Id. at art. 3.
51. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
52. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 3.1.
470 [Vo1.12:2
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lines adopted from the recommendations of the Codex,53 but al-
lows individual countries to establish stricter regulations under
certain conditions.5 ' These stricter guidelines are considered ac-
ceptable as long as they are "applied only to the extent neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, [are] based
on scientific principles [are] ... not maintained without suffi-
cient scientific evidence"55 and are not "applied in a manner
which would constitute a disguised restriction on international
trade."56 In addition, member countries are required to recog-
nize the equivalency of different procedures used by other mem-
ber countries for protecting against similar health risks 7 and to
base their own SPS measures on risk assessments. 8
Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the SPS Agreement will, in particular,
have a direct impact on the outcome of any food safety dispute.
Article 2.2 states, "Members shall ensure that any sanitary or
phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to
protect human ... life or health, is based on scientific principles
and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence."9
Article 3.3 requires member countries to consider all of the cri-
teria listed in Article 5,60 making it clear that member countries
53. The SPS Agreement defines the international standards to be used as fol-
lows: "[Flor food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations established
by the Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, veterinary drug
and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes
and guidelines of hygienic practice." See SPS Agreement, supra note 48, at Annex 1,
§ 3(a).
54. Id. at pmbl, art. 3.3.
55. Id. at art. 2.2.
56. Id. at art. 2.3.
57. Id. at art. 4.1 (requiring this recognition even in the event that the meas-
ures adopted by the exporting nation differ from the importing or other nations).
58. Id. at art. 5.
59. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 2.2.
60. Id. at art. 3.3. The criteria listed in article 5 are as follows: an assessment
of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, using risk assessment tech-
niques developed by the relevant international organizations that take into account
"available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant
inspection, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests;
existence of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental condi-
tions; and quarantine or other treatment." Id. at arts. 5.1, 5.2. Members also must
consider economic factors such as "the potential damage in terms of loss of produc-
tion or sales in the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease;
the costs of control or eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and the
relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks." Id. at art. 5.3.
Negative trade effects must be minimized and members must avoid arbitrary or un-
justifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situa-
tions, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade. Id. at arts. 5.4, 5.5. The Committee developing food safety
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may weigh scientific evidence more or less heavily along with
factors having a more direct effect on trade, but that they may
not completely disregard it in their analysis.6'
The SPS Agreement calls for conflicts to be heard by a panel
following the provisions of the GATT Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding.62 The SPS Agreement further states that in dis-
putes involving scientific issues, the panel may consult experts
familiar with food safety measures. 63 The experts' findings will
guidelines must "take into account all relevant factors, including the exceptional
character of human health risks to which people voluntarily expose themselves." Id.
at art. 5.4. Members must ensure that their measures "are not more trade-
restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosani-
tary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility." Id. at art.
5.6. When relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, "members may provisionally
adopt measures on the basis of available information," but must then "seek to obtain
the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and re-
view the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period
of time." Id. at art. 5.7. Finally, members who have reason to believe that a specific
measure introduced by another member is constraining its exports and the measure
is not based on relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, or
such standards, guidelines or recommendations do not exist, may request an expla-
nation of the reasons for such measure, which must be provided by the Member
maintaining the measure. Id. at art. 5.8.
61. Id. at art. 5.2.
62. Id. at art. 11.1. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides
that WTO member nations must consult before bringing a complaint before the Dis-
pute Settlement Body. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 4.2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994), available at http:ll
www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/28-dsue.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2003). If con-
sultations fail to resolve the conflict, the members may request the formation of a
panel to hear the conflict. Id. at art. 4.7. The panel's terms of reference are as fol-
lows:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered
agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the
DSB by (name of party) in document.., and to make such findings as will
assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings
provided for in that/those agreement(s).
Id. at art. 7.1. WTO member nations must consult before bringing a complaint be-
fore the Dispute Settlement Body. Id. at art. 4.
63. Terence D. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World
Trade Organization and the International Trade of Dairy Products, 54 FOOD DRUG
L.J. 55, 62 (1999). Article 11 of the SPS Agreement provides:
In a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or technical issues, a
panel should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel in consultation
with the parties to the dispute. To this end, the panel may, when it deems
it appropriate, establish an advisory technical experts group, or consult the
relevant international organizations, at the request of either party or on its
own initiative.
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directly affect the panel's decision as to the soundness of the sci-
entific principles and evidence used. 4
The SPS Agreement is designed to forestall food safety con-
flicts through mediated consultation between the disagreeing
member countries and to resolve them if they cannot be fore-
stalled.65  One of the resolution techniques is to disallow scien-
tifically unfounded food safety measures.66 The contrasting U.S.
and European responses to demands for food product safety that
arose with post-World War II mass production became a para-
digmatic arena for food safety conflict.6 7  While every nation
bases its regulations on some conception of the scientific
method, the underlying theories about acceptable risk vary
greatly. Southern Europeans favor regulations that would allow
their cheese-makers to continue crafting cheeses using the tra-
ditional ingredients so deeply rooted in their cultural heritage
and thus emphasize the importance of safe facilities and manu-
facturing methods. 8 U.S. citizens, however, tend to rely more
heavily on technology, adopting an aggressive approach to en-
SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 11.2.
64. Stewart & Johanson, supra note 63.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 56. The authors state:
The relevance of the SPS Agreement to the international trade of dairy
products.., could become more apparent in coming years. As tariffs and
subsidy levels for dairy products are lowered in accordance with the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture, national governments, acting under pressure
from domestic dairy producers, might provide protection to their constitu-
encies through the implementation of SPS measures. The scientific validity
of these measures might be challenged by other countries. The SPS Agree-
ment will provide the tools for challenging and possibly removing both ex-
isting and future sanitary measures for dairy products if they are proven as
scientifically unfounded. At the same time, recognizing the legitimate in-
terests of governments in protecting the health and safety of their popula-
tions, the SPS Agreement will permit countries to maintain SPS measures
that are based on science and that do not unnecessarily restrict interna-
tional trade.
Id.
67. Ridgway, supra note 32. Ridgway states:
At the present time it is illegal in the USA to sell raw milk cheeses which
have been matured for less than sixty days, and there have been moves to
ban the use of raw milk altogether. The Americans have twice tried to get
such a ban included in the Codex Alimentarius, which lays down regula-
tions worldwide.
Id.
68. Echols, supra note 29, at 532. "Since the cheeses have been produced and
eaten for hundreds of years with few public health consequences, consumers do not
believe these cheeses present a food safety risk, provided that certain sanitary prac-
tices are followed." Id.
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suring safety through mandatory sterilization of ingredients and
a policy of zero-tolerance for any bacteria at the outset of pro-
duction.69
An analysis of the likely argument for and against a U.S.
ban on raw-milk cheeses will demonstrate how the provisions of
the SPS Agreement work together. If WTO member countries
arguing for or against such a ban resort to the conflict-
resolution procedures set forth under the SPS Agreement, the
likely and just result is the rejection of a ban on raw-milk cheese
based on Articles 3 and 5 of the Agreement.
II. TO PASTEURIZE OR NOT TO PASTEURIZE: LEGAL AND
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
If the FDA recommends a ban on the manufacture and im-
portation of raw-milk cheese, member nations of the EU, par-
ticularly France and Italy, may protest." As WTO members,
these countries may raise a legal challenge to a ban on raw-milk
cheese, based upon the provisions of the SPS Agreement."
Since the United States is also a WTO member nation, it pre-
sumably would be required to follow any rulings by the Dispute
Settlement Body concerning a proposed ban.7 The legal issue
is, therefore, whether such a ban is permissible under the SPS
Agreement of the WTO.7' However, in an arena fraught with
questions of consumer taste, conflicting ideas of quality, and the
preservation of cultural heritage, policy arguments are an es-
sential part of any analysis. If a ban on raw-milk cheese is de-
termined to be legally permissible under the SPS Agreement,
countries and manufacturers opposing such a ban may still have
69. Id. "The acceptance of raw milk cheeses necessarily implies the rejection of
a pasteurization requirement." Id. The converse of this view is embraced by the
United States: the acceptance of a pasteurization requirement necessarily implies
the rejection of raw milk cheeses. Id.
70. In 1997, France exported seventy percent of its cheese production. The
United States is one of France's leading trade partners, along with several European
Community countries. FRANCE DIPLOMATIE: MAIN INDICATORS OF THE ECONOMY
AND FOREIGN TRADE, ITALY AND THE WORLD MARKET, at http://www.
france.diplomatie.fr/culturefrance/ressourcesletour/gb/texteconomie.doc (last vis-
ited Feb 4, 2003). In 2000, the United States was the third largest importer of Ital-
ian products, with cheese ranking high on the list of imports. PROMOTING ITALY:
ITALY AND THE WORLD MARKET, at http://www.italtrade.com/italy/world-market.htm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
71. SPS Agreement, supra note 47.
72. Id. at art. 13.
73. Id.
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potent arguments at their disposal.4
A. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED UNDER THE SPS AGREEMENT
The SPS Agreement allows individual member countries to
have more stringent food-safety requirements (SPS measures)
than those recommended in its guidelines, though only if these
heightened requirements have a scientific basis 75 or are found to
be "appropriate" based on risk assessments;76 do not constitute a
hidden restriction on free trade;77 and recognize equivalency of
71
alternate SPS measures.
1. The "Scientific Basis" Problem
If a ban on raw-milk cheese occurs, it will be a direct result
of food-safety studies performed by researchers at respected in-
stitutions.79 The United States may argue that the FDA ban is
based on its own review of laboratory studies, also called chal-
lenge studies, published and verified by independent third par-
ties.8° The results of these studies have been verified under ex-
acting conditions in state-of-the-art facilities by FDA scientists."'
The FDA may also argue that it has recommended the ban on
raw-milk cheese based on a well-founded scientific finding that
the product poses a threat to human health and that the ban
conforms to the requirements for a scientific foundation, as set
out in Articles 2 and 3 of the SPS Agreement. 2
The EU can counter this scientific argument on two fronts.
First, it may argue that the methodology relied upon by the
FDA to establish whether raw-milk cheese poses a safety threat
is incomplete and therefore fails to establish an adequate scien-
tific basis for the ban.83 Alternatively, the EU may argue that
the studies relied upon by the FDA not only present an incom-
74. See infra Part II.B.
75. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 3.3.
76. Id. at art. 5.
77. Id. at art. 2.
78. Id. at art. 4.1.
79. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
80. See F.D.A., supra note 21.
81. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
82. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 2.2. "Members shall ensure that any
sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect
human... life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence." Id.
83. See infra Part II.l.a.
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plete picture, but are themselves based upon flawed research
and, therefore, fail to establish a proper scientific basis.
a. Inadequate Methodology by the FDA
The FDA has based its review of raw-milk cheeses exclu-
sively on challenge studies under controlled conditions.85  The
EU may argue that laboratory studies are an acceptable and ex-
pected part of scientific food safety research, but that such stud-
ies present an incomplete picture.8 ' Along with these studies,
the FDA should study epidemiological data on whether raw-
milk cheeses have posed a significant threat to human health in
the past and, if so, under what conditions." Without these data,
research results exist in a theoretical vacuum instead of reflect-
ing real-world probabilities. 88 The EU may further note that the
epidemiological research that has already been done in Europe
shows that food scares over the past ten years have been almost
exclusively linked to meat products or foods containing eggs.9
The EU may also point out that in the United States, epidemiol-
ogical studies have shown little correlation between raw-milk
cheese and foodborne infection,90 and that pasteurized cheeses
are more likely than raw-milk cheeses to be implicated in food
84. See infra Part II.l.b.
85. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
86. See Donnelly, supra note 25, at 16.
87. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
88. See Bushnell, supra note 6.
89. For a summary of European food scares since 1981, see Emily Green, Gone
For Good? After 20 Years of Food Safety Scares, New European Regulations Threaten
to Abolish Many Traditional Crafts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2001, at Hi. Green suggests
that Europeans have become anxious about food safety as a direct result of the furor
created by bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also known as mad cow dis-
ease, and have reacted by regulating all foods, even those unrelated to BSE. Id.
90. K. Dun Gifford, Cheese Squeeze, at http://www.oldwayspt.org (last visited
Jan. 21, 2003). The author states:
Summary disease data, readily available from a number of government
sources (e.g. the CDC [Centers for Disease Control]), show eight episodes of
illness from eating cheese, and one death, from 1988-1997. During those
same years, the data show thousands of outbreaks, and hundreds of
deaths, from eating ground beef, chicken, eggs and some kinds of shellfish.
What remains to be researched are the details behind these statistics. For
example, some of the cheese illnesses are from "post-processing contamina-
tion" of cheeses made with pasteurized milk. The single mortality appears
attributable to a cheese made from a mix of pasteurized and unpasteurized
milks.
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poisoning outbreaks.9' The EU can make a powerful argument
that without factoring in these epidemiological findings, the sci-
entific argument for a ban on raw-milk cheeses is incomplete.
b. Flawed Research
The EU is also likely to question the research techniques re-
lied upon by the FDA. FDA researchers created an artificial
level of risk92 by injecting their cheese samples with several
thousand times more E. coli than would enter any cheese under
natural manufacturing conditions.9 In addition, the research-
ers in South Dakota, whose studies the FDA is replicating, cre-
ated their cheese samples without adding salt, a basic ingredi-
ent of all commercially-available cheese, and known to create an
environment hostile to bacteria such as E. coli.94 Finally, in sev-
eral cases, including the South Dakota study, researchers made
their cheese samples using pasteurized milk rather than raw
milk.95 While this may be useful in determining that contami-
nation of pasteurized process cheese during the production stage
results in health hazards for consumers, it proves nothing per-
taining to the safety of raw-milk cheeses.96 The EU can argue
that these three factors alone show that the studies relied upon
by the FDA are scientifically flawed and therefore fail to present
a proper scientific basis for banning raw-milk cheeses. 97
The dispute settlement panel hearing arguments by the two
91. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
92. Bushnell, supra note 6. The author wrote:
The heavy dosing with E.coli shocked Gifford ... co-founder of the cheese co-
laition. 'You'd have to put a whole cow flop in a can of milk to get it to that
level (of E. coli),' he says. 'And it would have to be a bad cow flop at that.
You wouldn't have that much unless it was intentional.'
93. Weinraub, supra note 20.
94. Donnelly, supra note 25, at 19 (discussing how the unnaturally low salt
content of the cheese used in the South Dakota study contributed to "an artificially
protective environment for E. coli 0157:H7").
95. Id. The author stated, "Reitsma & Henning (1996) examined the survival
of E. coli 0157:H7 during the manufacture and ripening of Cheddar cheese. E.
coli ... was inoculated at two levels to pasteurized milk..." Id. (emphasis added).
96. Bushnell, supra note 6. "To Donnelly, the flaws are fatal to the goals of the
studies. 'They showed in this pasteurized-milk, pseudo-cheese environment that (E.
coli) can survive. So what?' she asks." Id.
97. This argument has already been made by several U.S. groups opposed to
the proposed raw-milk cheese ban. Id. The U.S.-based Cheese of Choice Coalition
hired Catherine Donnelly to review the studies that determined pathogens could
survive aging in raw-milk cheeses beyond sixty days. Id. at 5. Her findings have
been instrumental in pressuring the FDA to place its review of raw-milk cheeses on
the back burner. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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sides will have to determine whether the U.S. ban has a scien-
tific justification, is based on scientific principles, is not main-
tained without sufficient scientific evidence, and therefore meets
the requirements of the SPS Agreement. 98 The panel must first
define "scientific justification,"99 "scientific principles,"00 and
"sufficient scientific evidence."10' To do this, they will need to
consult food safety experts.10 2 Findings by food safety experts
will directly affect the panel's decision as to the soundness of the
scientific principles and evidence used by the FDA in determin-
ing the necessity of a ban.' Unless the FDA incorporates epi-
demiological data into its research practices, the experts should
find that the scientific principles and evidence are not sufficient
and therefore are not sound.' °4 In addition, the experts should
find that the research performed to date is methodologically
flawed.' 1 Nonetheless, if the experts determine that the U.S.
ban is not based on sufficient scientific principles, the United
States may still try to fall back on the "appropriateness" clause
of the SPS Agreement.1"6
2. The "Appropriateness" Problem
The SPS Agreement provides that a member country may
impose more stringent SPS measures than those based on the
Codex guidelines if there is a scientific justification or if the
member country determines the measures "to be appropriate in
accordance with the relevant provisions of Paragraphs 1
through 8 of Article 5."1°7 These provisions allow member coun-
98. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at arts. 2.2, 3.3.
99. Id. "There is a scientific justification if, on the basis of an examination and
evaluation of available scientific information in conformity with the relevant provi-
sions of this Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant international stan-
dards, guidelines, or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection." Id. at art. 3.3 n.2.
100. Id. at art. 2.2.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
103. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 11.2.
104. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
105. See Donnelly, supra note 25; see also supra notes 93-97 and accompanying
text.
106. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 3.3.
107. Id. At first glance, this provision appears to allow stricter measures even
when the requirement of a scientific basis is not met. However, Article 5 concerns
the concept of risk assessment as a proper gauge of the level of SPS measures
needed by member countries, and includes scientific evidence in the factors to be
considered in risk assessments. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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tries to assess the risk posed by a given food practice to deter-
mine the proper food safety measure.108
The United States may argue that it has based its raw-milk
cheese ban on the risk assessment principles laid out in Article
5.109 The United States may also suggest that the scientific data
produced by the FDA review,"' even if insufficient standing
alone, can be analyzed in conjunction with economic factors such
as the costs of tracing food poisoning outbreaks, treatment of
the victims, removal of the products that caused illness, and
countering the inevitable backlash against dairy products with
its attendant negative effects on the dairy industry."' The com-
bination of these factors could result in a determination that
zero tolerance for cheese made from raw milk is appropriate. In
addition, the United States may argue that its decision to im-
pose a ban was based upon the precautionary principle that ob-
taining a potentially hazardous food product in a form not pos-
ing a food safety hazard minimizes risk.
If the United States raises Article 5, the EU is likely to
counter that the ban violates the provisions of the SPS Agree-
ment that mandate measures based on international guide-
lines. 2 The Codex guidelines for cheese make it clear that the
pasteurization of milk is permitted but not required."' Fur-
thermore, the SPS Agreement states that countries applying
measures based on standards higher than the international
norm must conform to the requirements of Article 3.3, which in-
clude the requirements laid out in Article 5.114 Therefore, ac-
cording to the SPS Agreement, the United States must demon-
strate that its risk assessment fits the requirements of Article
5." The EU is likely, however, to argue that the United States
should not be permitted to factor its scientific findings into its
risk assessment since they are fundamentally flawed." 6
Leaving aside arguments regarding the adequacy of avail-
108. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 5.
109. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
110. Weinraub, supra note 20.
111. See supra note 61.
112. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 3.1. "To harmonize sanitary and
phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall base [them]
on international standards .. . except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement,
and in particular in paragraph 3." Id.
113. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
114. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 3.3.
115. See supra note 61.
116. See supra Part II.A.1.
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able scientific evidence," 7 the failure of the United States to
consider the objective of minimizing negative trade effects"' and
its disregard of the requirement that "measures are not more
trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level
of sanitary or phytosanitary protection" also supports the posi-
tion against a ban on raw-milk cheese. 1 9 The imposition of a
ban on raw-milk cheese would create a de facto ban on importa-
tion of a large percentage of EU cheese production. 20 Therefore,
the ban would have a negative impact on European raw-milk
cheese exports because it would eliminate one of the EU's sig-
nificant markets. 2'
A previous WTO panel decision suggests that the United
States is likely to lose on its risk assessment argument.1 22 In a
dispute concerning an EU ban on the importation of beef treated
with growth-promoting hormones, the EU argued that its posi-
tion against beef hormones was based on risk assessments.1
23
The United States and Canada countered that the EU's position
was scientifically unfounded and designed to protect beef pro-
ducers in the EU from overseas competition. 124 The initial pan-
els found that the EU failed to demonstrate that its measures
were based on risk assessments,' 25 and the WTO Appellate Body
affirmed their conclusions. 126 The Appellate Body stated that,
while the precautionary principle can be inferred as a valid ap-
proach from the text of the SPS Agreement itself,27 it does not
117. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 5.2.
118. Id. at art. 5.4.
119. Id. at art. 5.6.
120. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
122. WTO Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 1246 (1998), avail-
able at www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) [hereinafter WT/DS26/AB/R]; WTO
Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), WT/DS48/ARB (Jan. 16, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 1708 (1998), available at
www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2003).
123. WTO Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997), para. 8.242, available at www.wto.org
(last visited Mar. 9, 2003).
124. Id. paras. 8.111-8.114, 8.152.
125. Id. paras. 8.82, 8.158, 8.261, 9.1.
126. WT/DS26/AB/R, supra note 122, para. 2.
127. Id. para. 124.
[The precautionary principle] is reflected also in the sixth paragraph of the
preamble and in Article 3.3. These explicitly recognize the right of Mem-
bers to establish their own appropriate level of sanitary protection, which
level may be higher (i.e., more cautious) than that implied in existing in-
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override the provisions of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agree-
ment. 128  The Appellate Body further stated that the EU had
failed to provide substantive evidence of a risk assessment. 129 It
concluded that the effect of the EU prohibition of meat contain-
ing hormones was to create a disguised restriction of trade.
Analogously, if the scientific basis for the decision by the
United States to ban raw-milk cheese were determined to be un-
founded, the use of a risk assessment incorporating the precau-
tionary principle would likely not be well-received by a dispute
resolution panel. 3'
3. The Disguised Trade Restriction Problem
Several arguments support the position that a ban on raw-
milk cheese would not unduly restrict trade. First, such a ban
would not constitute a measure disproportionately targeted at
imports because a ban on raw-milk cheeses would also have a
negative impact on domestic cheese producers. 132 Second, the
ban would have a minimal effect on actual U.S. trade practices
because much of the cheese imported by the United States from
EU countries is already pasteurized. 33 Third, any negative im-
pact caused by the ban would be resolved if the EU followed the
U.S. lead and imposed a pasteurization requirement for all
cheese intended for export.
These arguments, however, are left vulnerable to two im-
portant facts. First, raw-milk cheese production comprises be-
tween one and two percent of all cheese produced in the United
States, 34 so that any negative impact on domestic cheese pro-
duction caused by a raw-milk cheese ban would be minimal.
135
ternational standards, guidelines and recommendations.
Id.
128. Id. para. 125. Article 5.1 requires members to make risk assessments, and
Article 5.2 requires members to take available scientific evidence into account in
their risk assessments. SPS Agreement, supra note 47, at arts. 5.1, 5.2.
129. WT/DS26/AB/R, supra note 122, para. 76.
130. Id.
131. The United States, however, potentially could still argue that the effect of
the ban would not constitute an unfair trade restriction and that, therefore, it
should be allowed to stand.
132. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
133. The cheesemonger for a high-end Minneapolis grocery store estimates that
only ten to fifteen percent of cheese imported from Europe is unpasteurized. Inter-
view with Patrick Moore, Cheese Specialist, Lunds Grocery Store, in Minneapolis,
Minnesota (Jan. 7, 2003).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Paik, supra note 32, at 25 (noting that Kraft alone currently holds
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Second, although the majority of EU cheese imported to the
United States is pasteurized due to existing FDA require-136 13
ments,"' a sizeable percentage is unpasteurized.' Overall,
therefore, this ban would have a far greater impact on EU
cheese producers than on U.S. cheese producers.
138
Because the above statistics show that a ban on raw-milk
cheese would have disparate effects on domestic and foreign
cheese production, the dispute settlement panel hearing these
arguments would find that such a ban would have a proportion-
ally greater negative impact on the EU.139 The panel would then
have to make two determinations. First, it would have to decide
whether this negative impact could be mitigated by imposing a
pasteurization requirement on EU cheese producers. Second, it
would have to determine whether imposing such a requirement
on the EU would violate the provisions of the SPS Agreement
mandating acceptance of equivalent food-safety processes.
4. The Equivalency Problem
Article 4 of the SPS Agreement provides that member coun-
tries must accept the SPS measures required by other member
countries as equivalent, so long as the exporting member can ob-
jectively demonstrate that the measures provide the same level
of protection as those of the importing member. 4 0 This standard
applies even if the measures of the exporting country differ from
those of the importing country or of other member countries. 4
The EU could argue that by imposing high HACCP stan-
dards, the EU lowers risk to a level equal to that attained
through pasteurization in the United States. France will ar-
gue that the United States, by not accepting the HACCP system
forty percent of the North American cheese market).
136. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
138. See EU/Codex Alimentarius: EU Stands its Ground on Milk Hormones,
AGRI-INDUSTRY EUROPE § 2 (July 4, 1997) (indicating that as of 1997, annual sales of
raw milk cheese in Europe were around $7 billion). According to the article, Italy
and France produced some 240,000 tons and 210,000 tons of raw-milk cheese respec-
tively. Id; see also FROMAG.COM: AOC: DERNItRES STATISTIQUES, at www.fromag
.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2002) (indicating that in 2000, seventy percent of the AOC
cheeses manufactured in France were made with raw milk).
139. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
142. The FDA is actively promoting HACCP in other areas of food production.
See supra note 35.
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of regulation used by the EU as equivalent to pasteurization in
protecting consumers from foodborne pathogens, is violating Ar-
ticle 4 of the SPS Agreement. 43 France will also argue that it
can objectively show that HACCP has identical objectives
(eradication of tainted raw-milk cheese) and that its methods
achieve the same level of consumer protection as pasteuriza-
tion.144 Therefore, it will argue that the United States is con-
strained by the SPS Agreement to accept the EU's HACCP
methods as offering protection equivalent to pasteurization.
It will be difficult for the United States to claim that a ban
on raw-milk cheeses does not violate Article 4 of the SPS
Agreement. Unless it can show that HACCP methods do not re-
duce the risk of foodborne pathogens surviving in cheese as well
as pasteurization does, refusal to accept cheese produced
through HACCP methods will constitute a violation of the SPS
Agreement.' 4
B. POLICY AND OTHER ARGUMENTS RAISED BY A BAN ON RAW-
MILK CHEESE
Given that the probable outcome of any legal conflict under
the SPS Agreement would be adverse to a ban on raw-milk
cheese, the FDA would be well advised to take other policy-
related factors into consideration in determining whether such a
ban is advisable or practicable. Two groups within the United
States are particularly likely to make policy arguments against
banning raw-milk cheeses: producers of artisanal cheeses and
consumers of raw-milk cheeses.'46 Within the EU, makers of
143. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
144. France is likely to point to publications of the Codex, which actively pro-
motes HACCP procedures for food safety. See, e.g., CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, General
Principles of Food Hygiene, CAC/RCP 1-1969, rev. 3-1997 (amended 1999) (stating
on its cover page that "[t]he current version of the Recommended International Code
of Practice - General Principles of Food Hygiene including Annex on Hazard Analy-
sis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) System and Guidelines for its Application
was adopted by the Codex... in 1997").
145. It is unlikely that the United States could prove the superiority of the pas-
teurization method. As Professor Donnelly points out in her challenge study review,
"[t]his reviewer did not find any compelling evidence to indicate that mandatory pas-
teurization would lead to a safer product." Donnelly, supra note 25, at 3. Barry M.
Levenson also notes that in the food inspection arena, the U.S. federal government
actively promotes HACCP practices. BARRY M. LEVENSON, HABEAS CODFISH:
REFLECTIONS ON FoOD AND THE LAW 25 (2001).
146. These groups have, in fact, already formed an organization called the
Cheese of Choice Coalition to combat any ban on raw-milk cheese. See CHEESE OF
CHOICE COALITION, OLDWAYS, at http://www.oldwayspt.org (last visited Feb. 5,
2003]
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traditional raw-milk cheeses are also likely to make policy-
driven arguments for allowing the continued exportation of their
raw-milk cheeses.'47 On the other side, large-scale cheese
manufacturers and government regulators, including the FDA
itself, will likely make policy arguments in favor of mandatory
pasteurization.
1. Big Business v. Small Producers
Artisanal cheese-makers in the United States have greatly
improved their cheese-making techniques in the past several
years, increasing the availability of excellent, locally made raw-
milk cheese.'48 This has affected demand for fine cheeses, which
are becoming more popular and are beginning to claim a greater
share of the overall cheese market.9 Currently, the renais-
sance in cheese-producing techniques in the United States is al-
lowing many small farming operations to run a profitable busi-
ness."0 As a policy matter, small dairy farmers have a strong
argument that banning raw-milk cheeses would deprive them of
their livelihoods.
151
Large-scale cheese producers are likely to counter these pol-
icy concerns with claims that fairness and efficiency mandate
equal treatment of all cheese production facilities. 152 The FDA
will probably support this argument since bright-line rules are
much easier to enforce than rules with numerous exceptions.
Pasteurization is an easily enforceable way to minimize the risk
of foodborne pathogens. 54 Because zero-tolerance for foodborne
2003).
147. See Paik, supra note 32, at 28 (discussing the formation of the European
Raw Milk Alliance, which comprises members from every EU country).
148. Kummer, supra note 10, at 110 (discussing the high quality of U.S.-made
raw-milk cheese); see also Bilger, supra note 1, at 150.
149. See OLDWAYS PRESERVATIONS AND EXcHANGE TRUST, The Fight to Save
Raw Milk Cheese, at http://www.oldwayspt.org (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) (noting the
increasing market for raw-milk cheeses, which is in turn beneficially affecting the
viability of small dairy farms).
150. See id.
151. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
152. Of course, large-scale cheese manufacturers have global market share in
mind, which tends to color their policy priorities. "Industrial cheese.., is the easi-
est cheese for the few mega-corporations to produce, sell, and distribute across the
planet, even at the expense of the gustatory pleasure of millions." Paik, supra note
32, at 21.
153. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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illness is the FDA's watchword, 155 it may agree that pasteuriza-
tion should be mandatory for all cheese production.' However,
it should consider the issue of informed consumer choice when
deciding whether a bright-line pasteurization requirement is the
best solution.
157
2. Safety v. Choice
U.S. consumers of raw-milk cheese are likely to raise the is-
sue of informed choice, or risk assessments performed by con-
sumers. In the United States, many consumers regard raw-milk
cheeses with great skepticism,'58 while consuming foods such as
raw oysters and sushi with gusto in fine restaurants. 5 9 With lit-
tle seafood regulation by the FDA, consumers have learned to
perform their own risk assessments of these food items, weigh-
ing the restaurant's reputation and safety record, the time of
year, and their own senses in deciding whether or not to in-
dulge. 6 ' Similarly, items like cigarettes are readily available,
albeit with a warning label to remind consumers that health
hazards inherent in their consumption have been proven beyond
any doubt.16' Policy considerations of consistent treatment of
potentially risky items for consumption suggest that if consump-
tion of shellfish and cigarettes, known to be far riskier than
cheese, is left to consumer discretion, then consumption of raw-
milk cheese ought to be treated the same way. 162 This would al-
low consumers to have a wider range of cheese choices with less
regulation.
6 3
155. Bilger, supra note 1, at 150.
156. Id.
157. See infra Part II.B.2.
158. Bilger, supra note 1, at 150 (analogizing the state of raw-milk cheese
awareness to that of U.S. winemaking). Paik, supra note 32, at 22 (noting that U.S.
citizens tend to feel safer with pasteurization, and that at one time all California
wines were pasteurized, rendering them greatly inferior to European wines).
159. Bilger, supra note 1, at 156.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn.
1996) (holding that tobacco companies could be sued for health injury to persons
consuming their products).
162. Bilger, supra note 1, at 157. See also Howard Troxler, A Pedestrian Palate
Meets the Elegance of le Fromage, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at B1 (com-
menting on the unreasonableness of pasteurization requirements for a historically
safe product).
163. Bilger, supra note 1, at 157. "If the FDA were to allow it... we'd come to
trust certain farmsteads, whether their cheeses are aged or not, and when in doubt
choose pasteurized cheese. The alternative would be to stick to Cheez Whiz, and its
2003]
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The FDA is likely to counter that its overarching mission is
to ensure the safety of products intended for ingestion by con-
sumers. 64 If there is a genuine concern that raw-milk cheeses
are proven to pose unacceptable food-safety risks, then it is the
business of the FDA to eliminate these risks. 6 5 The benefit of
ensured public safety is arguably worth the pain of losing the
option to consume a few varieties of cheese. 1
66
3. Technology v. Tradition
Some EU countries may argue that the United States, by
imposing its zero-tolerance policy and infecting its trading part-
ners with its food-safety paranoia and dependence on technol-
ogy, adversely affects the food safety regulations being made by
other nations by forcing compliance with unnecessarily strin-
gent U.S. standards. 67 This results in an overall movement to-
wards zero-tolerance of risk and enforcement of strict compli-
ance with set standards. 68  Although this may reduce risk, it
also adversely affects small manufacturers of raw-milk cheese
who use traditional methods that have proven safe for thou-
sands of years.169 The ultimate effect, these countries might ar-
worrisome list of chemical additives, or avoid cheese entirely." Id.
164. The FDA's mission includes "protect[ing] the public health by ensuring that
foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly labeled." FDA, FDA'S MISSION, at
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html (Oct. 19, 1998).
165. See id.
166. From a technocrat's perspective, this argument flows logically from the
FDA's mission of protecting public health. See id.
167. There is some evidence that the U.S. zero-tolerance policy toward risk has
already had the effect of influencing stricter food-safety regulations within the EU.
See, e.g., Green, supra note 89, at H5 (discussing tightened regulations promulgated
by the EU in response to food scares).
168. Id. at H1.
169. Id. at 4 (A craftsman in Spain remarked that "[tihe local market used to be
a thriving, boisterous place.., it has been completely neutered by having all sorts of
remodeling done to comply with new regulations.., it has pushed what was a pretty
marginal activity for people beyond the point of nonexistence."); see also THOMAS
FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 35-36
(2000).
[Mayor Philippe] Folliot and the St. Pierre-de-Trivisy town council slapped
a 100-percent tax on bottles of Coca-Cola sold at the town's camp ground,
in retaliation for a tariff that the United States had slapped on Roquefort
cheese, which is produced only in the southwestern French region around
St. Pierre-de-Trivisy. As he applied some Roquefort to a piece of crusty
bread, Folliot told Swanson, "Roquefort is made from the milk of only one
breed of sheep, it is made in only one place in France, and it is made in
only one special way. It is the opposite of globalization. Coca-Cola you can
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gue, is to drive these small European cheese-makers, who tradi-
tionally make the raw-milk cheeses exported to the United
States, out of business.17 °
This argument has added resonance because it addresses
indirectly the problems that increasingly stringent regulations
have already caused small cheese-makers within the EU. 17' Af-
ter adopting the HACCP protocol and imposing it on European
cheese-makers, the EU has seen many small cheese-makers
driven out of business by the costs involved in its implementa-
tion.172  A pasteurization requirement would drive out many
more, particularly those who make AOC cheeses that, by law,
must be made with raw milk.
7
1
The FDA and some EU countries are likely to bring up pol-
icy considerations of consumer safety to counter this argu-
ment.174 Frightening new foodborne illnesses are forcing stricter
food-safety standards everywhere. 175  Protecting millions of
Europeans from mad cow disease 176 and E. coli177 is more impor-
tant than preserving the outmoded lifestyles of a few cheese-
makers. 178
4. Quality (as in excellence) v. Quality (as in uniformity):
Battling Definitions
The European and U.S. definitions of quality are considera-
bly different: "In the Catholic countries of southern Europe, es-
pecially in France and Italy, the notion of 'quality'. . . comprises
'the flavor, the excellence, and the authenticity of the land.' By
contrast, in [the United States], quality is 'above all synonymous
with security, with a regularity that follows a trademark..."9
buy anywhere in the world and it is exactly the same. [Coke] is a symbol of
the American multinational that wants to uniformize taste all over the
planet. That's what we are against.
FRIEDMAN, supra.
170. See Green, supra note 89, at H4.
171. Paik, supra note 32, at 27 (noting that according to one Italian cheese-
maker, the majority of producers of caciocavallo cheese have gone out of business
because they could not comply with the new manufacturing standards).
172. Id.
173. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
175. See Bushnell, supra note 6.
176. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
178. See generally Echols, supra note 29 (discussing the U.S. stance on zero tol-
erance in the context of food safety).
179. Chen, supra note 2, at 41-42 (internal footnotes omitted); see also Green,
20031 487
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Rather than regulating the European idea of quality out of exis-
tence by insisting on the U.S. idea of quality, cheese lovers
might argue, should we not try to achieve both ideals? 180 In
other words, less invasive methods than mandatory pasteuriza-
tion to control the risk posed by pathogens in raw milk should
be pursued, thus preserving the opportunity to find excellent
cheeses that are also safe to eat.181 For instance, given the im-
pressive safety record of raw-milk cheeses to date,1 2 cheese con-
sumers could argue that current regulations have proven highly
effective in ensuring the safety of cheese while allowing con-
sumers raw-milk alternatives.'
The FDA may have to concede this point after reviewing all
of the evidence. Although it has given no official reaction to the
independent review of its research,18 4 there are signs that the
FDA is taking the review seriously.1 5 If the FDA concedes that
its research is incomplete or concludes that there is an insuffi-
cient scientific basis on which to base a pasteurization require-
ment for all cheese, it is likely that current regulations will re-
main in effect.' In this case, cheese consumers will have the
satisfaction of being able to obtain cheeses that meet both the
European and U.S. definitions of quality.
18 7
CONCLUSION
The case for banning raw-milk cheeses is far from over-
whelming. The United States would have a difficult time con-
vincing a WTO panel that such a ban meets the requirements of
the SPS Agreement, since a protesting country could probably
supra note 89, at H4. "'Quality is a word I wouldn't use anymore,' says [a butcher
affected by HACCP regulations]. 'It doesn't necessarily mean good; it means clean or
spotless.'" Green, supra note 89, at H4.
180. Paik, supra note 32, at 26. "The American Cheese Society... believes that
forced pasteurization would erase an American heritage that predates Kraft ....
[Spokeswoman Debra Dickerson explains:] 'The goal of the FDA.. .is to eliminate
food borne illness. And no one would argue with that. But the issue is that you can
regulate to mediocrity.'" Id.
181. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
185. E-mail from Catherine W. Donnelly, Professor of Microbiology, University
of Vermont, to Martha Ingram, University of Minnesota Law School (Nov. 8, 2002,
12:14 CST) (on file with author).
186. See supra note 16.
187. Bilger, supra note 1, at 150.
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show that the ban did not have an adequate scientific founda-
tion, that it did not meet the equivalency requirement, and that
it failed to show a substantive basis for risk assessment. Given
the policy considerations agitating against such a ban, the FDA
would not fare any better on the policy level, especially if its own
research does not conclusively show that raw-milk cheese poses
a greater food safety threat than pasteurized cheese. When the
final results of the FDA review are released, the proper course
for the FDA will be to take these legal and policy considerations
into account and refrain from banning raw-milk cheese in the
United States. It should conclude that the existing pasteuriza-
tion requirement, with its exception for raw-milk cheeses aged
for at least sixty days, is adequate to protect consumer health
and provide consumers with desirable options.
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